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Bio: Dr Grant Christopher is a research fellow at the International Centre for Security 
Analysis at King’s College London where, since 2014, he has performed open-source research 
on nuclear non-proliferation and the impact of emerging technology on proliferation. Dr            
Christopher gained his PhD from New York University in experimental astroparticle physics for 
his work on Milagro: a water-Cerenkov cosmic-ray and gamma-ray detector. He then spent two 
years at CERN, affiliated with Brown University, as a member of the CMS collaboration, where 
he conducted fundamental particle physics research with the CMS experiment.  
 
Abstract: This paper examines the possibility of manufacturing critical nuclear-fuel 
cycle technology using 3D printers, in order to circumvent export controls. In particular, we 
examine the possibility that it may soon be possible to 3D-print maraging steel for use in a 
centrifuge to enrich uranium. We find that while significant technological challenges remain, an 
expert with access to an off-the-shelf 3D printer, advanced quality control technology and 
knowledge of centrifuges should be able to achieve this. Using these results we discuss the need 
for export controls of 3D printing technology and provide export control recommendations for 
printers on the basis of their specifications. 
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 Additive manufacturing has been hailed as a revolutionary technology1 that promises to 
begin a second industrial revolution, transforming supply chains and allowing the manufacture of 
items of great complexity at the same cost as more simple items. Whatever the effect on 
economies may be, the effect on export control regimes may be profound2: a digital file transfer, 
such as an email attachment, may provide the complete information to produce a physical item, 
provided one has the 3D printer and the material. Published work in security studies up to this 
point has not systematically compared current export controlled items with the technical 
specifications of today’s 3D printers, with the exception of a single overview.3 
 The reasons that current export control regimes have not included 3D printing technology 
to this point are unclear. The most likely explanation is that the technology is not considered to 
be mature and that it is assumed to be some years away from being a viable alternative to 
traditional, or subtractive, manufacturing. Yet, a number of developments suggest that the 
technology could be viable earlier than anticipated. 3D printing is already being used in the 
nuclear industry: at Sellafield, 3D scanning and printing technologies have been used to 
manufacture metal lids for low-level waste containers, in order to move waste around the site.4 In 
India, at the Raja Ramanna Centre for Advanced Technology of the Department of Atomic 
Energy, using their Laser Additive Manufacturing System, nuclear components have been 
fabricated for the reprocessing plant and the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor at IGCAR.5 In 
                                                
1 The Economist, “The Third Industrial Revolution”, The Economist, April 21, 2012. 
2 Ian Stewart, “Export Controls and 3D Printing”, Project Alpha, last modified June 7, 2013, 
https://www.acsss.info/news/item/236-export-controls-and-3d-printing. 
3 G. E. Christopher, “3D Printing: Implications for Non-Proliferation”, Proceedings of the ESARDA 37th Annual 
Meeting, (2015): 636-644.  
4 Tanya Powley, “Sellafield hopes to allay cost fears with 3D printing”, Financial Times, May 11, 2014.  
5 Amit D Adora, “DR. R. Chidambaram Indian’s premier nuclear scientist talks about 3d printing in India”, Smart 
Printing, last modified February 22, 2015, http://www.smartprinting.co/3d-printing-india/dr-r-chidambaram-indians-
premier-nuclear-scientist-talks-about-3d-printing-in-india/. 
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addition, the aerospace industry is already using the technology; Boeing, in 2014, patented the 
first 3D-printed part, a housing for a compressor inlet temperature sensor, which will be used in 
the BE90-94B jet engine on Boeing 777 aircraft.6 Finally, in May 2015, details emerged of a 
miniature 3D printed jet engine from GE that can rotate at 33,000 rpm—a similar magnitude to 
that required for uranium-enriching centrifuges.7 Both the nuclear and aerospace industries 
demand high-quality, high-strength parts; the parallel provides a strong indication that 3D 
printing technology could soon be applicable to the production of export controlled items used in 
the nuclear fuel cycle. 
Additive Manufacturing 
Additive manufacturing (AM) is the catchall phrase for 3D printing and associated 
technologies. This includes scanning technologies, which create digital copies of physical objects 
that can be used for 3D printing. The digital design files, or Computer Aided Design (CAD) files 
are created in a standard format and various software packages can then be used to alter the 
designs. Software packages are also used to slice the files into a series of layers to prepare for 
printing. The production part of the technology, 3D printing, is in fact a ‘big tent’ of different 
technologies that includes plastics and metal, along with biological tissue, chemicals and food. 
Most of this is not relevant to any discussion of nuclear export controls and the only interesting 
technologies in this case are those that use metals and plastics. 
                                                
6 Rocke Robert Koreis, “Three Dimensional Printing of Parts”, United States Patent: 51625781, September 5, 2013 
7 David Szondy, “GE fires up fully 3D-printed jet engine”, Gizmag, last modified May13, 2015, 
http://www.gizmag.com/ge-fires-up-all-3d-printed-jet-einge/37448/. 
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The most flexible technologies are the metal printing technologies of Selective Laser 
Sintering (SLS) and Selective Laser Melting (SLM). Direct Metal Laser Sintering (DMLS) is 
also referred to in the literature and is similar to SLS.8 In these technologies, metal powder is 
printed in layers and a Computer Numerically Controlled (CNC) multi-axis laser with high 
power fuses the particles within each layer together, along with fusing each new layer to the 
previous one. In SLS, only the boundaries of the powder are melted and fused together; whereas 
in SLM the powder is completely melted, allowing for more dense material.  
The layers themselves are formed by two different methods. In the first method, each 
layer is a ‘bed’ of powder and, after each layer has been scanned by the laser, the platform 
lowers and a roller places a new bed of powder which acts as a supporting structure. In the 
second technique, the structure is ‘constructed’ from the ground up in the manner of a building. 
A large number of metals are available for 3D printing, including: stainless steel, 
titanium, Inconel (a nickel-chromium alloy) and maraging steel: a class of low carbon, high-
nickel, stainless steel in the ‘martensic’ phase that has been precipitation hardened or ‘aged’; 
hence the term maraging, from martensic aging. Of these, maraging steel is the most relevant 
material to the nuclear fuel cycle as it has the required properties for use as components in a 
centrifuge to enrich uranium; specifically, the rotor, baffles and endcaps. Of these, the rotor is 
the most difficult to produce and has the most stringent requirements for material properties. 
Concerning high-strength materials, only high-strength aluminium, maraging steel and carbon 
fibre are currently export-controlled for their potential for use in centrifuges. 
                                                
8 Thomas Grünberger and Robert Domröse, “Direct Metal Laser Sintering”, Laser Technik Journal, Vol. 12 Iss. 1 
(2015): 45-48. 
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3D Printing of Maraging Steel 
Printing high strength materials that have similar characteristics to those traditionally 
produced for nuclear purposes requires a detailed understanding of the manufacturing process. It 
is not quite as simple as clicking ‘print’ after one has obtained a CAD file with the required 
geometry. The printing material, maraging steel powder, has the same bulk chemical 
composition as traditionally manufactured maraging steel. This corresponds to US 18% Ni 
Maraging 300, European 1.2709 and German X3NiCoMoTi 18-9-5; these are typically grades 
that would be export controlled when traditionally manufactured. For both traditionally 
manufactured and printed steel, in a post-processing stage, the material must be held at a high 
temperature for two to three hours whilst the metal undergoes the transition from the more brittle 
and less hard austenite phase to the stronger martensite phase.  
Independent of the post-processing steps, there are many reasons why the mechanical 
properties of 3D-printed maraging steel would differ from that traditionally manufactured. A 
large volume of technical literature dedicated to understanding the causes of these differences 
has emerged. Advances in understanding the 3D printing process have led to production of high-
quality maraging steel with comparable characteristics to the traditionally manufactured 
material.9,10 Yet, there remain key questions over the properties of 3D-printed maraging steel. 
The 3D printing process involves the use of a high-powered laser to melt or partially melt the 
powder, which in turn involves high thermal gradients—meaning heat from the laser will 
                                                
9 Evren. Yasa, Jan Deckers, Jean-Pierre Kruth, Marleen Rombouts and Jan Luyten, “Charpy impact testing of 
metallic selective laser melting parts”, Virtual and Physical Prototyping, Vol. 5, Iss. 2, (2010): 89-98. 
10 G. Casalino, S.L. Campanelli, N. Contuzzi, A.D. Ludovico, “Experimental investigation and statistical 
optimisation of the selective laser melting process of a maraging steel”, Optics & Laser Technology, Vol. 65, 
January, (2015): 151-158. 
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dissipate rapidly. This can introduce residual stresses into the material.11 For the 3D-printed 
material, however, the single most important parameter for macro-mechanical properties is the 
relative density.12 A density close to 100%, where few pores have formed in the printing process, 
provides the best thermal conductivity, ductility, yield strength and fracture toughness. This is 
determined by the processing parameters: powder feed rate, laser scan speed, laser power, scan 
spacing, beam diameter as well as scanning sequence, scanning atmosphere and the parameters 
chosen in re-melting completed surfaces.13 The high thermal gradient can also influence this. The 
initial powder quality (size distribution, elemental composition and temperature-dependent 
powder properties) also has a significant effect on the material properties.14 Another outstanding 
issue is the noted reversion of 3D-printed maraging steel into the austenite phase from the 
martensite after age hardening;15 this undermines a material’s strength and is not seen to occur in 
traditional manufactured maraging steel.16 
Considering the time it would take to print a typical centrifuge rotor with current 
technology is an important benchmark for current applicability to the technology. An estimate of 
building rate for a typical metal printer is between 2-20 mm3/s.17 Using an open source estimate 
                                                
11 C. Casavola, S. L. Campanelli, and C. Pappalettere , “Preliminary investigation on distribution of residual stress 
generated by the selective laser melting process”, C, J. Strain Analysis, Vol. 44, No. 1, (2009): 93-104. 
12 J. P. Kruth et al., “Part and material properties in selective laser melting of metals”, 16th International Symposium 
on Electromachining (ISEM XVI), April 19-23, (2010). 
13 Ibid. 
14 T. B. Sercombe, “Sintering of Freeformed Maraging Steel with Boron Additions”, Mat. Sci & Eng.A., Vol. 363, 
Iss. 1-2,, (2003): 242-252. 
15 Yasa et al., “Charpy impact testing of metallic selective laser melting parts”, 89-98. 
16 Ibid. 
17 EOS “EOSINT M 270”, EOS, last modified August 2, 2012, 
http://dmlstechnology.com/images/pdf/EOSINT_M_270.pdf. 
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of a centrifuge volume18 it would take about between 1.5 to 15 days to produce a centrifuge rotor 
at this rate of printing. Neglecting machine handling time and maintenance etc., ten machines 
working in parallel would take a time between two weeks to half a year to produce 100 
centrifuge rotors, with estimates likely to be on the conservative side due to the quality 
requirements of the product. Efforts are being made, however, to design multi-laser printers that 
significantly reduce these build times.19 
Challenges to producing 3D printed maraging steel with properties comparable to 
traditionally-manufactured maraging steel are being gradually overcome. Not only that, but these 
problems are being solved by understanding the 3D printing process, by parametric refinement of 
existing procedures, not the introduction of new hardware. It is entirely conceivable that the 
current generation of 3D printers could be used to manufacture key components of one of the 
sensitive and controlled technologies in the nuclear fuel cycle. Yet, developing production of 
beyond-the-state-of-the-art materials requires a detailed understanding of the laser-powder 
interaction that involves software simulation and increased expert proficiency in knowledge of 
the process. Would 3D-printed components be fit-for-purpose and are we likely to ever see 3D-
printed centrifuges?  
Illicit procurement by states has always been a flexible process and states have shown a 
willingness to adapt, as has been shown in a study on Iranian nuclear technology procurement 
                                                
18 United States Senate, “Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s 
prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq”, U.S. Senate, July 9, 2004. See page 109 for specifications of the Beams 
centrifuge rotor which has a volume of about 2600 cm3. 
19 Hipolite, “Borealis Project Looks to Create Large, Super Fast 3D Metal Printers With Multiple Laser 
Technologies in One”, 3dprint.com, last modified July 1, 2015, http://3dprint.com/77915/borealis-project-3d-
printers/. 
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practices.20 However, with centrifuges, it must be stressed that the mechanical requirements of 
the materials are quite strict. To be able to print parts that are fit-for-purpose, access to advanced 
quality control machinery, such as scanning electron microscopes, is required. This places a high 
threshold on the knowledge and advanced machinery needed to print centrifuge rotors from an 
off-the-shelf printer.  
It is worth discussing what other items from the Nuclear Supplier’s Group (NSG) trigger 
list and dual use list are suitable for 3D printing. Not any item that is of interest due to its 
chemical composition is a suitable candidate for 3D printing; this includes various materials such 
as uranium, plutonium, nuclear grade graphite, zirconium and beryllium. Items with many 
components, including some parts with special materials or complex moving parts with 
electronics are also not (currently) suitable: this includes items such as frequency inverters, 
pressure transducers, lasers, hot cells and remote manipulators. We are therefore left to examine 
other materials to use for centrifuge manufacturing including carbon fibre and aluminium, as 
well as plastics that are resistant to the highly corrosive UF6.  
For what concerns aluminium, it can be 3D printed, although the ultimate tensile strength, 
the only criterion other than geometry that has export-control limits, is well below the 
specification for use in centrifuges.21   
Printing Carbon Fibre 
                                                
20 Ian. J. Stewart, Nick Gillard and John Druce, “Iran’s illicit procurement activities: Past, present and future”, 
Project Alpha, July 24, 2015, https://www.acsss.info/proliferation/item/428-iran-s-illicit-procurement-past-present-
and-future. 
21 “EOS Aluminium AlSi10Mg Data Sheet”, EOS, last modified June 18, 2014, https://ip-saas-eos-cms.s3-eu-west-
1.amazonaws.com/public/8837de942d78d3b3/4e099c3a857fdddca4be9d59fbb1cd74/EOS_Aluminium_AlSi10Mg_
en.pdf. 
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Carbon fibre, a material commonly used for centrifuge rotors, has recently been 3D-
printed. The Mark One printer, available from the 3D printing company Markforged for around 
$6,000, can print carbon fibre, fiberglass, Kevlar and nylon.22 Carbon fibre rotors are 
traditionally manufactured using filament winding machines, which are currently export 
controlled, as are the fibres themselves. Unlike maraging steel therefore, the material used by the 
machine to print is in this case export controlled. The filament winding machines, used to make 
centrifuge rotors, are designed for cylindrical geometries. Carbon fibre 3D printers may be used 
to print this geometry, but it is unclear if the printed material will meet the strict geometric 
quality requirements. It is also not clear if “printed” carbon fibre would meet mechanical 
requirements. As carbon fibre rotors are difficult to manufacture, it is unlikely that printing 
technology presents a viable manufacturing option. Nevertheless, development of this 
technology should also be monitored.    
Corrosion Resistant Plastics 
The interest in plastics, rather than stemming from use in the moving parts of centrifuges, 
stems from the corrosion resistance of Fully Fluorinated Materials (FFM). Fluoropolymers, such 
as polytetrafluorethylene (PTFE), polythene where the hydrogen is replaced with fluorine, are 
common examples of such materials. However, PTFE and other fluoropolymers do not melt 
when heated so would not be suitable for 3D printing using the Fused Deposition Modelling 
(FDM) technology, which is commonly used for plastics. Other FFM such as FEP, PFA, PCTFE 
and Vinyidene fluoridehexafluoropropylene suffer from the same problem. No plastic FFM 
                                                
22 “The Mark One”, Markforged, accessed July 22, 2015, https://markforged.com/mark-one/. 
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exists at the moment that would be suitable for 3D printing. Consequently, any 3D-printed UF6-
resistant plastic would have to be developed.  
Manufacturing items with the current generation of printers is both expensive and time 
consuming; a metal printer costs around $750,000 and printing large items such as centrifuge 
rotors with high quality specifications could take 1-2 days. Expensive additional hardware would 
also need to be purchased for quality control. The minimum diagnostics set-up for basic 
metallurgical analysis of test materials produced by SLS or SLM, and assessment in their range 
of application includes: morphological analysis by means of scanning electron microscopy, 
elemental analysis by means of X-ray spectroscopy and mechanical analysis by means of an 
indenter and stress strain curves. To traditionally manufacture using a flow forming machine 
costs around $1m for the machine itself and takes a few minutes.23 Obtaining the pre-form tubes 
and providing sufficient quality control will take a lot longer, but similar steps would be required 
for printed parts. 
Relevance of 3D-printing to Weaponisation 
To what extent should we be concerned about 3D printing of delivery systems? An 
extensive amount of open-source work has already been performed on the technical dimensions 
of the little-boy gun type device, even by members of the public.24 However, any large explosive 
device is a clear security threat and should be controlled as strictly as possible. Special nuclear 
                                                
23 “Economics of Light Weighting Steel Wheels Through Flow Forming”, Auto Steel, last modified 10 October 
2011,   http://www.autosteel.org/~/media/Files/Autosteel/Great%20Designs%20in%20Steel/GDIS%202010/14%20-
%20Economics%20of%20Light%20Weighting%20Steel%20Wheels%20through%20Flow%20Forming.pdf. 
24 David Samuels, “Atomic John”, New Yorker, December 15, 2008. 
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materials are under export controls and cannot be 3D printed. We can take comfort from the fact 
that any nuclear device serves no purpose without fissile material.   
A similar argument can be made for missile systems: to what extent is it realistically 
possible to use 3D printing to bypass missile export controls? Raytheon has recently 
manufactured most parts of a guided missile through 3D printing.25 This indicates that the 
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) may benefit from a similar analysis to that 
performed in this paper: to look at components in critical areas of ballistic missile technology 
that may be manufactured using 3D printers in order to circumvent export controls. 
From the legal perspective, the framework is still being put in place to cope with a world 
in which 3D printing is common.26 Copyright may be placed on the written word, and ideas may 
be patented, but you cannot copyright objects unless they have an individual design. US 
copyright does not extend to “…any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, 
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, 
illustrated, or embodied in such work”.27 Therefore, it would not be possible to copyright a 
design such as a cylinder. The implication of this for non-proliferation, where this paper 
envisages an illicit procurement channel of centrifuges via maraging steel printing, is unclear. 
Existing Hardware 
                                                
25 “To Print a Missile: Raytheon Research points to 3-D printing for tomorrow’s technology”, Raytheon, last 
modified July 13, 2015, http://www.raytheon.com/news/feature/3d_printing.html. 
26 D. Mendis, D. Secchi, and P. A. Reeves, “Legal and Empirical Study into the Intellectual Property Implications of 
3D Printing”, Project Report. London: Intellectual Property Office, (2015). 
27 Oliver Herzfeld, “Protecting 3D Printing Designs and Objects”, Forbes, May 5, 2013, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/oliverherzfeld/2013/05/29/protecting-3d-printing-designs-and-objects/. 
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It seems increasingly clear that 3D printing of maraging steel using the current generation 
of printers, for use in a uranium-enrichment centrifuge is plausible. Export controls for high-
precision multi-axis CNC machinery are already in place in WMD export controls, but these do 
not yet cover 3D printers.  
Printers that are currently maraging-steel-capable are limited to a small number, 
including: the EOS M series28, the Matsuura Lumex Avance-25,29 Renishaw AM250,30 SLM 280 
or SLM 50031 and Concept Laser machines.32 Any export controls for 3D printers should be 
constructed to include these models, whilst excluding others that are not capable of printing 
high-strength maraging steel. All of the above machines are 5-axis tools operating 200 W or 400 
W fibre lasers. The build volumes are all similar: around 250 x 250 x 325 mm3. The thickness of 
each powder layer varies, but the upper limit is 100-200 µm. The laser focus diameters, the size 
of the beam that fuses the powder together, are in the range 50-200 µm. All these machines are 
capable of operating the build chamber in an inert atmosphere, which is also a requirement to 
print maraging steel.  
Towards Export Controlling 3D Printers 
Further examination of 3D printing technology is clearly required to completely 
understand the class of printers that are maraging-steel-capable. However, comparison with the 
                                                
28 “EOSINT M 270”, EOS, last modified August 2, 2012, 
http://dmlstechnology.com/images/pdf/EOSINT_M_270.pdf. 
29 Matsuura, “Matsuura Lumex 25 - Additive Manufacturing Machine”, innovatetec, last modified 2015, 
http://innovatetec.com/matsuura-lumex-avance-25-additive-manufacturing-machine/. 
30 “Renishaw AM250”, Renishaw, accessed July 22, 2015, http://www.renishaw.com/en/am250-metal-additive-
manufacturing-3d-printing-system--15253. 
31 “SLM 500”, SLM Solutions, accessed July 22, 2015, http://www.stage.slm-solutions.com/index.php?slm-500_en. 
32 “Concept M3 Linear Technical Data”, Concept Laser, last modified March 21, 2012, 
http://www.yingfeng.com.hk/image/RP-CL/101120_M3_English_view.pdf. 
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export controls guidelines for multi-axis machine tools for cutting33 under the NSG dual use list 
for “Test and Production Equipment” is useful. These guidelines control machines with two or 
more axes within specified positioning accuracy, specifically covering various types of 
machines. 
Laser technology encompasses an enormous variety of instruments with a wide range of 
uses. However, all lasers used in 3D printers are fibre lasers, which significantly narrows the 
range of focus when discussing applicable laser technology in 3D printers. To define precise 
specifications for export control of 3D printers yet more information is required. We can discuss 
the key parameters and likely ranges to consider controlling. We suggest the key parameters to 
consider are: laser power, number of positioning laser axes, laser positioning accuracy, laser 
beam focus diameter, laser scan speed, layer thickness, machine build volume and the ability to 
print in an inert atmosphere.  
Export controls are already in place for lasers that could be used to enrich uranium by 
laser isotope separation techniques such as AVLIS, MLIS and CRISLA. These laser enrichment 
techniques include the use of multiple lasers operating at specific wavelengths, pulse durations 
and powers. The export control provision that covers these lasers could perhaps be extended to 
cover lasers that could be used in 3D printers. However, this would essentially amount to export 
controlling the key components of 3D printers to be built. The current generation of 3D printers 
that print maraging steel are an expensive advanced technology that may prove difficult to 
construct.  
                                                
33 “NSG Guidelines dual use list, June 2013”, Nuclear Suppliers Group, last modified June 2013, Paragraph 1.B.2. 
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Laser power for printers discussed earlier is consistently 200/400W. It is not clear 
whether a lower-power laser would have sufficient energy density to melt the metal, but the 
industry choices certainly show a common design preference. The number of laser axes to 
control would likely be lower than five; manufacturing a cylindrical geometry should be possible 
with two axes only. The technical literature indicates that lower laser accuracy would produce 
parts below required mechanical specifications due to the lower material density.34 Control over 
the scan speed is also a key parameter required to produce high-strength stainless steels. The 
build volume issue is far simpler to understand as it would be controlled on the basis of being 
able to produce useful parts. Maraging steel is export controlled if material exceeds the 
mechanical strength specification where all dimensions are above 75 mm; this would likely 
cover all commercially available printers.  
Current Export Controls 
Knowledge of how to print quality high-strength metals is continually advancing and 
available from open sources.35 The literature on manufacturing maraging steel using subtractive 
manufacturing is also open source.36 Tacit knowledge also plays an important role in the 
manufacturing process for maraging steel, as is the case for nuclear weapons-related 
                                                
34 Yasa et al. “Charpy impact testing of metallic selective laser melting parts”, 89-98.  
35 Casalino et al., “Experimental investigation and statistical optimisation of the selective laser melting process of a 
maraging steel”, 151-158. 
36 Joel S. Hirschhorn and David A. Westphal, “A new Approach for the Production of Maraging Steel P/M Parts”, 
Modern Developments in Powder Metallurgy, (1971): 481-490. 
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technology.37 However, access to this technology is limited: the flow forming machines required 
to manufacture by this method are export-controlled, as are multi-axis milling machines.  
The export control of multi-axis subtractive manufacturing machinery sets a precedent for 
export control of 3D printers that similarly use multi-axis lasers to print high-strength materials. 
Any export control guidelines should be based at least partially on the laser system, including on 
the following criteria: number of axes, laser power, and precision which govern the complexity, 
precision and strength of the manufactured item. These parameters should be specified as to 
restrict the final quality of materials that can be printed. 
As for the control of the associated technology, it may be thought prudent to export 
control CAD files that fulfill particular requirements. If the product that one is trying to protect is 
a centrifuge rotor then this results in attempting to export control CAD with cylindrical 
geometries; an obvious non-starter. Other more complicated geometries where 3D printing could 
be applicable would be more suitable for export control.  
To consider previous attempts to control 3D printed designs the printed gun is an 
illustrative case. To control CAD files for 3D-printed guns has been a huge challenge for US law 
enforcement. When the first handgun from Defense Distributed, dubbed “The Liberator”, was 
designed, the CAD files were made available through the company’s website. Before the US 
Department of Defense ordered their removal, the designs were downloaded over 100,000 
times38. The CAD file could then easily be shared privately via email or posted on numerous file-
                                                
37 Donald MacKenzie and Graham Spinardi, “Tacit Knowledge, Weapons Design and the Univention of Nuclear 
Weapons”, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 100 (1995): 44-99. 
38 J. Preston, “Printable-Gun Instructions Spread Online After State Dept. Orders their Removal”, New York Times, 
May 10, 2013. 
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sharing websites, including those on the dark web. Whilst the level of interest in this handgun 
CAD represents the popularity of firearms and resistance to government regulation in the United 
States, it also highlights the challenge in controlling any CAD file. A nuclear fuel cycle-related 
CAD would not likely have such a high level of popularity. Yet even if control over sensitive 
designs could be obtained, it is worth considering the likelihood of our being able to protect 
designs from cyber-crime39, insider threat40 or state-sponsored cyber-attack.41 However, we can 
again point to the fact that, at least for the nuclear fuel cycle, the items that are most likely to be 
3D-printed have simple geometries so controls over the CAD are impractical. Export controlling 
weaponisation is a different matter however.  
Conclusion 
We are currently in an unconstrained era of export controls on 3D printing technology. 
The manufacturing base for advanced additive manufacturing, for now, is in North America, 
Europe and Japan. It seems that the difficulties in printing maraging steel to meet the 
requirements for use in centrifuges are gradually being overcome. It should therefore be in the 
interests of the EU and its member states, the USA and Japan to introduce export controls for 3D 
printers based on the parameters discussed above. The NSG should also introduce corresponding 
controls. At present, 3D printing constitutes an unmanaged potential proliferation pathway. The 
                                                
39 “Former U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Employee Charged with Attempted Spear-Phishing Cyber-Attack 
on Department of Energy Computers”, FBI, May 8, 2015,  
https://www.fbi.gov/washingtondc/press-releases/2015/former-u.s.-nuclear-regulatory-commission-employee-
charged-with-attempted-spear-phishing-cyber-attack-on-department-of-energy-computers. 
40 Mark Warren, “Modern IP theft and the insider threat”, Computer Fraud & Security, Vol. 2015, Iss. 6 (2015): 5-
10. 
41 Paul A Walker, “Law of the horse to law of the submarine: The future of State behavior in cyberspace”, Cyber 
Conflict: Architectures in Cyberspace (CyCon), 2015 7th International Conference, (2015): 93-104. 
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technical community should work together with policy makers and the wider non-proliferation 
community to address this issue as soon as possible.   
Acknowledgments 
Thanks to Nick Gillard and Dominic Williams for a discussion on flow forming 
machines.  
Christopher 19 
Bibliography 
Adora, Amit D. “DR. R. Chidambaram Indian’s premier nuclear scientist talks about 3d printing 
in India”. Last modified February 22, 2015. http://www.smartprinting.co/3d-printing-
india/dr-r-chidambaram-indians-premier-nuclear-scientist-talks-about-3d-printing-in-
india/. 
Auto Steel. “Economics of Light Weighting Steel Wheels Through Flow Forming”. Auto Steel. 
Last modified 10 October 2011.   
http://www.autosteel.org/~/media/Files/Autosteel/Great%20Designs%20in%20Steel/GDI
S%202010/14%20-
%20Economics%20of%20Light%20Weighting%20Steel%20Wheels%20through%20Flo
w%20Forming.pdf. 
Casalino, G., Campanelli, S.L. Contuzzi, N. and Ludovico, A.D. “Experimental investigation and 
statistical optimisation of the selective laser melting process of a maraging steel”. Optics 
& Laser Technology. Vol. 65, January (2015): 151-158. 
Casavola, C., Campanelli, S. L. and Pappalettere, C. “Preliminary investigation on distribution of 
residual stress generated by the selective laser melting process”. C, J. Strain Analysis. 
Vol. 44, No. 1, (2009): 93-104. 
Christopher, G. E. “3D Printing: Implications for Non-Proliferation”. Proceedings of the 
ESARDA 37th Annual Meeting. May, (2015): 636-644. 
ConceptLaser. “Concept M3 Linear Technical Data”. Yingfeng. Last modified March 21, 2012. 
http://www.yingfeng.com.hk/image/RP-CL/101120_M3_English_view.pdf. 
The Economist. “The Third Industrial Revolution”. The Economist. April 21, 2012. 
EOS. “EOS Aluminium AlSi10Mg Data Sheet”. EOS Last modified June 18, 2014. https://ip-
saas-eos-cms.s3-eu-west-
1.amazonaws.com/public/8837de942d78d3b3/4e099c3a857fdddca4be9d59fbb1cd74/EO
S_Aluminium_AlSi10Mg_en.pdf. 
EOS. “EOSINT M 270”. EOS, Last modified August 2, 2012. 
http://dmlstechnology.com/images/pdf/EOSINT_M_270.pdf.  
FBI. “Former U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Employee Charged with Attempted Spear-
Phishing Cyber-Attack on Department of Energy Computers”. FBI. Last modified May 8, 
2015. https://www.fbi.gov/washingtondc/press-releases/2015/former-u.s.-nuclear-
Christopher 20 
regulatory-commission-employee-charged-with-attempted-spear-phishing-cyber-attack-
on-department-of-energy-computers. 
Grünberger, Thomas and Domröse, Robert. “Direct Metal Laser Sintering”, Laser Technik 
Journal. Vol. 12 Iss. 1 (2015): 45-48. 
Hipolite, W. “Borealis Project Looks to Create Large, Super Fast 3D Metal Printers With 
Multiple Laser Technologies in One”. 3dprint.com. Last modified July 1, 2015. 
http://3dprint.com/77915/borealis-project-3d-printers/. 
Hirschhorn, Joel S. and Westphal, David A. “A new Approach for the Production of Maraging 
Steel P/M Parts”. Modern Developments in Powder Metallurgy. (1971): 481-490. 
Herzfeld, Oliver. “Protecting 3D Printing Designs and Objects”. Forbes. Last modified May 5, 
2013. http://www.forbes.com/sites/oliverherzfeld/2013/05/29/protecting-3d-printing-
designs-and-objects/. 
Koreis, Rocke Robert. “Three Dimensional Printing of Parts”. United States Patent: 51625781. 
September 5, 2013. 
Kruth, J. P. et al. “Part and material properties in selective laser melting of metals”. 16th 
International Symposium on Electromachining (ISEM XVI). April 19-23, 2010. 
MacKenzie, Donald and Spinardi, Graham. “Tacit Knowledge, Weapons Design and the 
Univention of Nuclear Weapons”. American Journal of Sociology. Vol. 100 (1995): 44-
99. 
Markforged. “The Mark One”. Markforged. Accessed July 22, 2015. 
https://markforged.com/mark-one/. 
Matsuura. “Matsuura Lumex 25 - Additive Manufacturing Machine”. Innovatetec. Last modified 
2015, http://innovatetec.com/matsuura-lumex-avance-25-additive-manufacturing-
machine/. 
Mendis, D., Secchi, D., and Reeves, P. A. “Legal and Empirical Study into the Intellectual 
Property Implications of 3D Printing”. Project Report. London: Intellectual Property 
Office. 2015. 
Nuclear Suppliers Group. “NSG Guidelines dual use list, June 2013”. Nuclear Suppliers Group. 
Last modified June 2013. 
Powley, Tanya. “Sellafield hopes to allay cost fears with 3D printing”, Financial Times, May 11, 
2014. 
Christopher 21 
Preston, J. “Printable-Gun Instructions Spread Online After State Dept. Orders their Removal”. 
New York Times. May 10, 2013. 
Raytheon. “To Print a Missile: Raytheon Research points to 3-D printing for tomorrow’s 
technology”. Raytheon. Last modified July 13, 2015. 
http://www.raytheon.com/news/feature/3d_printing.html. 
Renishaw. “Renishaw AM250”. Renishaw. Accessed July 22, 2015. 
http://www.renishaw.com/en/am250-metal-additive-manufacturing-3d-printing-system--
15253. 
Samuels, David “Atomic John”. New Yorker. December 15, 2008. 
Sercombe, T. B. “Sintering of Freeformed Maraging Steel with Boron Additions”. Mat. Sci & 
Eng.A. Vol. 363, Iss. 1-2, (2003): 242-252. 
SLM Solutions. “SLM 500”. SLM Solutions. Accessed July 22, 2015, http://www.stage.slm-
solutions.com/index.php?slm-500_en. 
Stewart, Ian J. “Export Controls and 3D Printing”. Project Alpha. June 7, 2013. 
https://www.acsss.info/news/item/236-export-controls-and-3d-printing. 
Stewart, Ian J., Gillard, Nick and Druce, John. “Iran’s illicit procurement activities: Past, present 
and future”. Project Alpha. July 24, 2015. https://www.acsss.info/proliferation/item/428-
iran-s-illicit-procurement-past-present-and-future. 
Szondy, David. “GE fires up fully 3D-printed jet engine”. Gizmag. Last modified May13, 2015. 
http://www.gizmag.com/ge-fires-up-all-3d-printed-jet-einge/37448/. 
United States Senate. “Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence 
Community’s prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq”. U.S. Senate. July 9, 2004. 
Walker, Paul A. “Law of the horse to law of the submarine: The future of State behavior in 
cyberspace”. Cyber Conflict: Architectures in Cyberspace (CyCon), 2015 7th 
International Conference. (2015): 93-104. 
Warren, Mark. “Modern IP theft and the insider threat”. Computer Fraud & Security. Vol. 2015, 
Iss. 6 (2015): 5-10. 
Yasa, Evren, Deckers, Jan, Kruth Jean-Pierre, Rombouts Marleen, and Luyten, Jan. “Charpy 
impact testing of metallic selective laser melting parts”. Virtual and Physical 
Prototyping. Vol. 5 Iss. 2, (2010): 89-98. 
 
